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Abstract 
The purpose of this research paper was to determine whether annual 
income is an indicator of a respondent’s level of support for the Californian 
independence movement. Ultimately, the analysis here determined that 
there is not a statistically significant relationship between the income of the 
participant and their support for secession in California. However, the data 
analysis did yield that there is a correlation between an index of ‘Support for 
Secession’, ‘Interest in Secession’ and ‘Seriousness of Claim’ and income. In 
addition, this research project determined that there is not a statistically 
significant relationship between the political ideology of the respondents and 
support for secession. There is, however, a positive relationship between the 
race and gender of the respondent and support for secession. 
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Introduction 
 The United States of America has a rich history of secession move-
ments. The foundation of the state, from a historical perspective, only oc-
curred because one such movement was successful. Throughout history, 
Americans have demonstrated a repeated willingness to be set apart from 
the whole in the name of differences of political opinion. In the twenty-first 
century, this tradition remains a fundamental part of modern political dis-
course. From proposed referendums in Texas to independence committees in 
southern Washington, this concept is one that continues to boast impressive 
news coverage and relevance.  
 In particular, the concept of secession maintains importance in the 
state of California. Once an independent nation, its independence move-
ments have gained national prominence. Reasons often cited for this depar-
ture include considerable cultural differences, political alienation and varying 
economic conditions. In order to address the underlying cause, one must 
first attempt to quantify the background of the secessionist culture that ex-
ists in California. Nowhere else in the country is departure from the Union 
discussed in such a way that garners as much national media attention as 
often as California does.  
 The state is depicted in popular media as a paradise for the “Hollywood 
Elite” and sports a climate that is unlike any other place in the country. The 
state is, on average, the most diverse in the Union from a demographic per-
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spective and its cities serve as examples of both the highest concentrations 
of wealth and of the most extreme poverty. It should be no great surprise 
that an independence movement would thrive in these conditions.  
 The “Cal-Exit” movement is not the oldest in the country. It is, howev-
er, the most consequential. California’s economy is one of the largest in the 
world. Its unique location on the Pacific Coast affords it geo-political impor-
tance.The reasons behind this movement’s popularity are as critical as its 
end result.  
I. Literature Review 
A. Gaps in the Literature 
 Academic literature on secession in California is sparse. Despite this 
deficiency, there is enough literature present to serve as a “jumping off” 
point for additional research. Any research conducted from here onward will 
serve as a fundamental building block for further study, but will not have the 
benefit of past knowledge. In the case of this study, the body of literature 
discussed above has been used to develop a theoretical basis for the survey 
design that follows. The information present has informed the design of the 
questions being asked.  
 There is limited coverage on the ‘Cal-Exit’ movement. There is a large 
quantity of “pop-science” and “pop-culture” type pieces from news outlets 
such as Buzzfeed and CNet. These articles, while providing general informa-
tion, lack theoretical rigor. They are unfit for use in an academic study. This 
	 	  4
is largely because the information they provide is anecdotal. They rely on 
unrepresentative personal stories to tell a narrative. This narrative does not 
serve a purpose beyond popular education and entertainment. For the pur-
pose of this thesis, these articles have only been used as background infor-
mation.  
B. A Definition of Secession 
 Secession is classically defined as "the formal withdrawal of a con-
stituent unit from an established, internationally recognized state and the 
creation of a new state.”  The relationship between a secessionist subgroup i
and the larger state is an issue of domestic politics. If a secessionist move-
ment is successful, the relationship is redefined from a domestic one to an 
international one. Disputes at this point become governable by international 
law. A successful secession “recasts the link”  between the parent and child ii
state. This transitory state is often in dispute as “parent” states refuse to 
recognize the “child” state as independent. For example, the Chinese do not 
recognize Taiwan as independent despite Taiwan’s self-governance . Estabiii -
lishing independence is often a more involved process than winning an 
armed conflict. Gaining independence involves securing this recognition from 
the parent state for security reasons. It also involves gaining recognition 
from a collection of other states as an independent international actor.  
C. A Brief History of America’s Revolutions 
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 There have been a number of  successful secession movements  in  
American history. The first real secessionist movement was the Hartford 
Convention. Due to opposition to the Louisiana Purchase, a group of New 
England delegates met to discuss secession from the Union . The key proiv -
posal debated at the convention centered on ejecting the new western 
states. Many delegates to the convention felt that the Founders had not in-
tended for the nation to expand westward. Thomas Jefferson’s purchase of 
an unorganized western territory was outside the bounds of the Constitution 
and was opposed by the Federalists who made up the majority of the con-
vention.  
 The most ambitious attempt at secession in American history was the 
Civil War. The facts of the conflict have been the subject of hundreds of 
books and thousands of classroom discussions. The importance of the Civil 
War in this review is the establishment of a parallel in the thinking between 
it and the Hartford Convention. Both of these movements stem from the 
idea that the departing section is more representative of the “real America” 
than the remaining section. This is a common theme in American secession 
movements. For example, Texas seceded from Mexico because it felt its na-
tional identity was more authentically American than Mexican .  v
 As opposed to military or political secessionist movements, several se-
cessionist movements also exist in a cultural space. Chicano activists have 
created a formidable artistic output of works surrounding the idea that the 
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federal government’s claim to the western United States are legally and 
morally unjust. Nominally referred to as “Aztlán” , the proponents of this vi
pseudo-historic ethno-state make sweeping claims of independence. These 
more ephemeral separatist movements lack the same sort of ‘ultra-Ameri-
can’ thrust as their contemporaries. However, the existence of Aztlán does 
not invalidate the overwhelming evidence in the literature that supports the 
ideology mentioned above. This is because they introduce an entirely sepa-
rate cultural exclusion component. This component can easily be extended to 
define movements that are more conventional if the argument is made that 
the “parent state” is excluding the culture of the “child state”.  
D. The Theory of Independence  
 There is a large amount of literature concerning the theoretical aspects 
of independence movements. The vast majority note that there is little in the 
sense of specific unifying features. Secessionist movements come in all 
shapes and sizes. Therefore, independence theories must be broad enough 
to apply to the vast majority of circumstances while also having enough 
specifics to avoid being meaningless. There are several theories that are 
general enough to be useful, but specific enough to draw significant insight.  
 One theory holds that the question of secession is ultimately answered 
by the strength of a group of people’s claim to territory. A successful seces-
sionist movement must succeed in proving to the state that its conception of 
its own boundaries are incorrect. If a party is considered to have a right to 
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secede, according to Wellman , it must prove that its own territorial claim is vii
stronger than that of the state. In addition, it must also prove that there is 
no third party with a claim that is inherently stronger than either of them. 
Therefore, the question of whether or not secession is justified must be an-
swered by whether or not the state’s claim to the affected territory is justi-
fied.  
 “Just Cause Theory (JCT)  postulates that secession is only justifiable viii
in cases of “grave injury”. This grave injury must not be able to be appeased 
through traditional means. The theory does not define what a “grave injury” 
entails. Most contemporary scholars agree that an injury can only be consid-
ered grave if traditional means of redressing the grievances have been at-
tempted. If they have been attempted and were unsuccessful, the JCT can 
serve as a justification.  
 The alternative to the JCT is known as the “Choice Theory” . President ix
Thomas Jefferson wrote this theory in 1816 in a letter to William Crawford. 
Jefferson held that “If any State in the Union will declare that it prefers sep-
aration with the first alternative, to a continuance in union without it, I have 
no hesitation in saying, 'let us separate’.” In layman’s terms, Jefferson is 
claiming that the union of a collection of states is dependent on mutual 
agreement. If a state feels that this arrangement cannot continue, the state 
can simply leave. The “grave injury” clause is not necessary. A continued 
union is a matter of preference.  
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 These two theories serve as umbrellas under which there are several 
other potential justifications. One of the most consequential is that of cultur-
al autonomy. If a minority group feels a majority ruling party is suppressing 
its culture, then it has the right to secede to protect cultural heritage .In adx -
dition, it also holds that a minority group in a political community has the 
right to cede itself from a majority group in order to expand its existing po-
litical rights.  
 Beyond these general justifications, Aleksander Pavkovic  claims that xi
there are five general justifications for secession within the bounds of liberal 
political theory. Liberal political theory is defined as the theoretical construct 
that surrounds liberalism, a political philosophy that emphasizes freedom of 
choice and varying measures of equality . First, Pavkovic claims that secesxii -
sion is justified if a culture is threatened. Second, any group that faces polit-
ical disenfranchisement has a right to separate from the parent state. Third, 
a desire to extend democratic participation and, fourth, a desire to extend 
and develop an independent culture all fall as permissible reasons for seces-
sion. Finally, Pavkovic holds that if a group of “like-minded” individuals wants 
to create a new political order, they have the right to do so. The literature 
includes several other minor forms of justifications for separatism. However, 
most are too specific to a circumstance to be viable for this analysis. They 
are not included here.  
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 There is a comparably large amount of literature concerning the moti-
vations of secessionists. In The Dynamics of Secession by Michael Hecter , xiii
he argues that secession rarely comes from a singular event. Secession, in-
stead, comes from a wide variety of factors that culminate in separation 
from the “parent” state.  
 The most relevant of these factors to the case in California include 
both alienation and differing economic interests. Despite the fact that Cali-
fornia is both the largest economy in the United States and the sixth largest 
in the world , less than one-third (31%) voted for Donald Trump in the two xiv
thousand sixteen election. California is ranked as one of the most liberal 
states in the Union. The geographic distance that Californians experience 
from the federal capital of Washington DC also serves as a large psychologi-
cal barrier to participation in the federal system . Representatives and Senxv -
ators from far removed parts of the country whose value systems are differ-
ent from those of Californians decide large percentages of federal policy.  
 California is a hub for technology and research and development. This 
economic sector is largely outweighed by agriculture in other areas of the 
country . The legalization of medical marijuana places a burgeoning growth xvi
industry opposed to large swathes of the nation both economically as well as 
financially.  
E. Income and Secession  
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 The literature tends to support the assertion that an increase in in-
come correlates positively with a support for political change. Specifically, 
long-term economic growth is positively correlated with desire for political 
change that works to increase political freedoms . In high-income areas xvii
that have sustained large amount of economic growth, liberal economic and 
political ideas tend to flourish . This leads to higher levels of political acxviii -
tivism. It also increases the likelihood for discontent, as empowered citizens 
prove less likely to tolerate a perceived difference between their expecta-
tions for government and the reality of it. When this change occurs, the po-
tential for support for political separation increases, according to Lipset.  
 This occurs because an increase in income “alters” the perception of 
democratic values such as tolerance and moderation . An increase in supxix -
port for democracy has been linked to an increase in these values and vice 
versa.  
 Lipset  notes that an increase in income leads to a greater preference xx
for democracy. Regimes that did not fit this mold face greater threats to 
their continued existence when the mean income is higher. When the prefer-
ence for democracy increases, so does a preference for “liberal and freedom 
oriented values.” 
 However, it is unclear whether an increase in income translates to any-
thing beyond nominal support for secession. Inglehart & Welzel demonstrate 
that democratic elites in wealthy countries often stymie support for indepen-
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dence because these citizens tend to be better educated . Because they xxi
have received more schooling, they are well equipped to translate secession-
ist sentiment into reality. Elites, in these cases, are more likely to give into 
the demands of the citizenry to put off actual secession. In this way, a gap 
appears between support for secession and the actual action thereof as 
those wealthy and in power take additional steps to prevent departure from 
the state itself. Income, according to Welzel, makes the proposition of seces-
sion more attractive, but does not translate to an increase in the frequency 
of its occurrence.  
F. Political Ideology and Secession  
 Political ideology could potentially confuse the relationship between in-
come and support for Californian secession. The literature tends to support 
the claim that the conservative or liberal ideology of a person does not di-
rectly affect whether or not they will develop support for a secessionist 
movement. A historical survey reveals that there is very little in common be-
tween the revolutionaries in the Americas in 1776 and the communist rebels 
in Grenada two hundred years later.While these are not strictly secession 
movements, the purpose of their inclusion is to demonstrate the wide range 
of ideologies that can be pushed to the point of advocating for radical politi-
cal change. This isn’t to say that political ideology should be dismissed. As 
opposed to partisanship, the primary “ideology” that motivates support for 
secessionists is a desire for political autonomy .  xxii
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 This desire for political autonomy can be properly termed as national-
ism . Nationalism, in the context of secession, can be defined as a shared xxiii
sense of values and cultures that set one group apart from other groups. A 
strong relationship between nationalism and self-determination exists. A 
group of people becomes compelled to act to determine their own form of 
government when their relationship to their own national identity becomes 
stronger than their relationship to the national identity of the “parent” coun-
try. Little seems to indicate that (modern) conservativism or liberalism has 
an effect on whether someone decides to pursue independence from the 
state. Specifically, a liberal state might want to secede from a more tradi-
tional society and a conservative one may desire to separate from a union 
that is less rooted in its values. Instead, the degree to which nationalism is a 
component of a person’s political beliefs serves as a descriptor.  
 California’s history of nationalism is not one to balk at. Given the fact 
that the ‘Bear Flag Republic’ existed as an independent entity prior to its in-
corporation into the Union, a strong sense of nationalism and identity has 
always existed in California .  xxiv
G. Historical Background  
 The Californian secessionist movement is difficult to term because it 
often stops and starts. It is prone to sudden surges and equally prone to 
disappearing. In the twenty-first century, there are a wide variety of inde-
pendent organizations all working for similar goals. It is important to note 
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that they often disagree on the methods.The difference in aims has led to a 
situation that is both confusing from an outsider’s perspective and difficult to 
study.  
 The current standard-bearer of the Californian Independence Move-
ment is Yes California. This is the successor organization to Sovereign Cali-
fornia, which closed its doors in 2015. Yes California, helmed by Louis Mar-
tinelli, was responsible for the trending of ‘CalExit’ on social media. While the 
group did gain the approval of the Office of the Secretary of State to begin 
gathering signatures for an independence referendum, they failed to do so 
before the filing deadline.  
 The California Nationalist Party seeks to force an exit from the United 
States through legislation at the state level. This organization, which merged 
with ‘Californians for Independence’ to prevent the latter’s dissolution, has 
yet to secure a representative seat in the state. On a yearly basis, it holds a 
candidate nominating convention in Sacramento.  
 The movement faced its first major setback with the revelation in 2018 
that its public face, Marinelli, was a New Yorker living in Moscow. In 2016, 
the expat announced that he had opened an embassy in an office space sit-
uated in Moscow. This cultural center was designed to educate Russians on 
the culture of California compared to the larger United States. The aim of 
this effort was to promote international support for the movement. A group 
of investigative journalists revealed that the “embassy” was being fronted by 
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a Putin-backed Russian charity. In addition, information came to light that 
there had a been a major attempt to manipulate Twitter’s trending algorithm 
in favor of the movement after the victory of Donald Trump. Marinelli was 
pushed out of the movement by his contemporaries. He subsequently an-
nounced his intention to seek permanent residence in Moscow.  
 After Marinelli’s exit, the credibility of the PAC suffered a major hit. 
The primary focus of the movement has been image rehabilitation and re-
stabilization. Support for secession in California has waxed and waned with 
media coverage. The survey indicated that support peaked at nearly 1/3 of 
registered Californians in March of 2017 according to a poll conducted by UC 
Berkeley . However, since this poll, little data has been collected on the xxv
topic. Surveys that have been conducted have only estimated general inter-
est . Two less-academic polls have been conducted in the period since the xxvi
Berkeley survey, but both have suffered from low sample sizes. This makes 
the independent verifiability of the results difficult to determine .  xxvii
H. Stated Reasons for Californian Secession 
 There are several key arguments made by proponents of Yes California 
for the independence of the state. California, if it were an independent state, 
would boast the world’s sixth largest economy . The state’s gross domesxxviii -
tic product eclipses that of several larger and more well established western 
democracies such as France. Members of Yes California claim that the state’s 
economic diversity would lend itself naturally to self-sufficiency and that 
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most of the potential problems could be offset by a more comprehensive 
trade partnership with countries in the Pacific Rim. In terms of population, 
an independent California would be the world’s thirty-fifth most populous 
country . Proponents of Californian secession argue that a body of this size xxix
has no need for a connection with the United States because its tax base is 
large enough to provide for all essential services it is receiving from the 
United States currently. In addition, its population, supporters claim, is large 
enough to support a serviceable military. In addition to statistics, the Yes 
California movement also uses political differences with the rest of the coun-
try concerning the environment as one of the key justifications in its litera-
ture. For example, Californians, on average, are more likely to support car-
bon-reductive or carbon neutral policies . These are a series of initiatives xxx
that have proven immensely unpopular in other more rural areas of the 
country. This is not the only significant “gap” in political opinion. In large 
swathes of the state, the Republican Party is a virtual non-entity , a fact xxxi
that is not representative of the reality in large portions of the rest of the 
country. Because of the difference in state party composition, the “Overton 
Window” of viable politics in California is markedly different from that of 
anywhere else in the country . Californian secessionists use these political xxxii
and economic facts and statistics to demonstrate that California’s presence 
in the Union no longer makes logical sense.  
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 In addition to the numbers, proponents of Yes California also appeal to 
a legal argument. When Louis Marinelli initially submitted his ballot initiative 
to the Californian legislature, he compared the annexation of California by 
the United States to the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 . In this document, xxxiii
Marinelli holds that the narrative that the majority of Californians wanted to 
join the Union was false. Instead, Californians were robbed of the chance for 
self-determination. Marinelli concludes his argument with the claim that the 
only way to redress this “grave injury” is through departure from the Union, 
a clear invocation of JCT.  
II. Core Question 
 The question this research will attempt to address is whether a per-
son’s socioeconomic status has any correlation with a person’s approval or 
disapproval for the movement for Californian independence from the United 
States as embodied by the Cal-Exit Movement, Californian Independence 
Party and related sub-groups. It is my preliminary hypothesis that the 
wealth a person possesses above a certain threshold will be a sufficient indi-
cator of whether or not a person views secession favorably. This threshold is 
likely above the poverty threshold and somewhere above an annual salary 
commiserate with a “living wage” of fifteen dollars an hour . The existing xxxiv
body of research indicates that “white collar” workers will be more likely to 
entertain more “fanciful” political ideologies when they have the leisure time 
to do so (see literature review). In this sense, fanciful is not meant in a 
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derogatory fashion, but to represent the idea that some political positions 
are more difficult to satisfy than others are. I theorize that this indicator will 
be able to paint a sufficiently compelling image as to whether or not a per-
son supports an independent California.  
III. Research Gaps 
 The key gap my research is attempting to fill is the question of 
whether socio-economic status in the average layperson has a measurable 
effect on whether that respondent supports secession. Demonstrating a clear 
socioeconomic link through the utilization of California as a modern case 
study would be a valuable step in determining a clear theory as to what 
causes support for secession.  
IV. Survey Design 
 The following survey was designed to assess whether there is a posi-
tive or negative correlation between levels of wealth among Californians and 
their support for partition from the United States of America. It must be 
made clear, however, that this sample is not an entirely random sample of 
the population of California and is only a random sample of those that utilize 
the MTurk platform.It is primarily composed of people not only from the 
state of California. 
 This poll was administered utilizing Amazon’s “MTurk” service. Partici-
pants were paid .10 cents for completing the survey and no other incentives. 
The survey itself was distributed utilizing the MTurk database and consisted 
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of ten questions. Those questions and their response options are listed be-
low.  
Survey Questions A
With 0 being the least 
interested and 100 being the 
most interested, please rate 
how likely you would be to do 
additional research on this 
topic if the opportunity 
presented itself. 
Respondents were asked to 
respond to indicate from 0-100 
in their response for this 
question. 
With 0 being the least serious 
and 100 being the most 
serious, please rate how 
serious you would take the 
above proposition if it was 
presented to you 
Respondents were asked to 
respond to indicate from 0-100 
in their response for this 
question. 
Are you a citizen of the state 
of California? 
Yes. No. 
What is your sexual 
orientation?
Respondents were asked to 
indicate this through a written 
field. 
What is your estimated 
annual income?
Respondents were asked to 
indicate this through a written 
field. 
What is your level of political 
activity, with one hundred 
being the most active?
Respondents were asked to 
respond to indicate from 0-100 
in their response for this 
question. 
Please provide your age. Respondents were asked to 
indicate this through a written 
field. 
With 0 being the most liberal 
and 100 being the most 
conservative, please place 
yourself on the political 
ideological spectrum
Respondents were asked to 
respond to indicate from 0-100 
in their response for this 
question. 
With 0 being the least likely 
and 100 being the most likely, 
please rate how likely you 
would be to THEORETICALLY 
support California's complete 
secession from the United 
States. 
Respondents were asked to 
respond to indicate from 0-100 
in their response for this 
question. 
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 In the above chart, a “red” square indicates that the respondent chose 
“No. ”. A yellow or green option indicates that the respondent was directed 
to the next screen. After the respondent completed the survey, they received 
a message detailing the purpose of the survey. This was the extent of the 
survey portion of the experiment.  
V. Survey Analysis 
 The survey, over all, provided a bevy of interesting and relevant data 
to facilitate an evaluation of the aforementioned hypothesis. In this section, 
I will denote the steps taken in order to accurately analyze the data, as well 
as the results of that analysis. While the survey did ultimately serve to an-
swer the question this thesis has been designed to address, it also provided 
other related insights that help create a compelling picture…more than what 
a single correlation coefficient might have ultimately allowed.  
VI. Procedure 
 The survey was administered, as stated above, on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. The initial target number of survey participants was designated as one 
thousand, however, after the obvious trolls were removed from considera-
tion, 813 responses were left for analysis. These responses were down-
loaded in a  CSV format in a single batch from the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
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website and imported into Microsoft Excel for further processing. Each col-
umn was given an alpha-numeric representation that would function as its 
title for analysis in R Studio, starting at V1. Once each column was reduced 
to either entirely numeric data or “string” data (letters and numbers), I uti-
lized R. Studio to import them as a data set. Once imported into R Studio, I 
downloaded the ‘GGHUB’ package of commands in order to utilize the COR() 
function to conduct a Pearson correlation test on the various columns of 
data.  
 The Pearson test produces a response between zero and one. A result 
of one indicates a clear and obvious positive correlation between the value 
sets. A response of negative one indicates an obvious negative correlation 
between the two. For my first bit of analysis, I conducted several Pearson 
tests on the data. The results are detailed in the next section.  
VII. Univariate Income Statistics  
 The average income of participants was $52,917.89. The first quartile 
of the income data is $21,500. The median income is $35,000. The third 
quartile is 60,000. The IQR of this data set is [21000 - 60000].  
From $0-$1000 in 





7.86% of the data set. From $10,000-$19,999, there were ninety-sixty re-
spondents that comprised 11.97% of the total results. From $20,000-
$29,999, there were one hundred and forty-three respondents that com-
prised 17.83% of the total results. From $30,000-$39,999, there were one 
hundred and sixteen respondents that comprised 14.46% of the total re-
sults. From $40,000-$49,999, there were eighty-seven respondents that 
comprised approximately 10.8% of the data set. From $50,000-$59,999, 
there were ninety respondents that comprised 11.22% of the total results. 
From $60,000-$69,999, there were fifty-eight respondents that comprised 
7.23% of the total results. From $70,000-$79,999, there were thirty-four re-
spondents that comprised 4.24% of the total results. From $80,000-
$89,000, there were twenty-nine respondents that comprised 3.62% of the 
total results. From $90,000-$99,999, there were twenty-five respondents 
that comprised 3.12% of the total results. From $100,000-$109,999, there 
were twenty-six respondents that comprised 3.24% of the total results. Be-
yond this point, the grand total of results until the maximum point was ulti-
mately negligible, but is still represented above on the histogram.  
VIII. Pearson Tests on Political Ideology 
 I chose to conduct this particular set of variables to analyze and to 
provide further validity to the connection between income and support for 
secession. While there was no significant information in the literature to indi-
cate a connection between these values, the vast majority of those sources 
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were historical and thus insufficient in minimizing the possibility that there 
has been some sort of shift and political ideology is now a driving factor in 
the aforementioned relationship.  
 The goal, through the inclusion of this subsection, is to completely rule 
out that there is a connection.  
A. Political Ideology and Interest in Concept  
 The survey recipients were asked to rank their self-perceived political 
ideology from 0-100, with zero being the most liberal a respondent could 
possibly be, and 100 being the most conservative. In a similar vein, the re-
spondents, in a separate question were asked to rank their current level of 
support for Californian independence from the United States from 0-100, 
with 100 being the most supportive. Of the 813 valid test takers, everyone 
responded to these two questions. The Pearson test of the correlation be-
tween these two columns of data was low at 0.063. This would seem to indi-
cate that a person’s political ideology has little to no effect on their interest 
in Californian independence from the United States. The P value is 0.176, 
and is insignificant.  
B. Political Ideology and Seriousness of Claim 
 The relationship between one’s ideology and the validity with which 
they view the claim is statistically insignificant, however, is notably stronger 
than the relationship between political ideology and interest in secession. 
The correlation coefficient between the ‘Political Ideology’ question (Q8) and 
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the ‘Seriousness of Claim’ question (Q2) was 0.34. While not high enough on 
the scale to indicate a strong, undeniable connection between the two, this 
amount does seem to indicate that there is at least a weak positive relation-
ship present, meaning that the more conservative a recipient was, the more 
likely they were to take the claim seriously as opposed to simply dismissing 
it out of hand. The P value for this set of variables is 0. This indicates that 
there is sufficient evidence to support the negation of the null hypothesis, 
which demonstrates that there likely is a relationship between the political 
ideology of the participant and the level of seriousness with which they take 
they claim.  
C. Political Ideology and Support for Secession  
 According to the results of the survey, there is little to no correlation 
between a person’s political ideology and their support for Californian inde-
pendence. The Pearson test resulted in a correlation coefficient of 0. 171621, 
which, while positive, still qualifies as a weak connection between the two 
different columns of data.  The P value is 0.07, and while this does not reach 
the traditional 0.05 threshold, this value suggests that we should not com-
pletely rule out the possibility that there is a relationship between these two 
variables.  
D. Political Ideology Analysis  
 The weak relationship that the ideology factor demonstrates with the 
aforementioned questions seems to rule out its use as a relevant determiner 
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of what causes an American to out and out support secession or, at mini-
mum, have interest in the idea. The primary take away from these particular 
Pearson tests seems to be that that there is a weak relationship, at best, be-
tween support or even interest in the idea of an independent California and 
the level of conservativeness a person ultimately exhibits. This would seem 
to indicate that there is another factor or set of factors that could serve as a 
more accurate predictor for these two vectors other than one’s political ide-
ology, if such a factor exists at all. It is important to note that the relative 
weakness of this particular indicator does not necessarily mean that there is 
not another, stronger indicator. The low, but positive, set of correlation coef-
ficients simply indicates that ideology is an insufficient and unideal method 
of prediction.  
IX. Pearson’s Tests on Annual Income 
A. SUPPORT FOR SECESSION AND ANNUAL INCOME  
 There is a weak and almost nonexistent correlation between support 
for secession and the annual income of the recipient. In short, this means 
that the amount of money made in one year has little to no effect on one’s 
support for secession in California. This is not to say that it never has an ef-
fect, but instead to say that its correlation (—0.01) is low enough to be 
unimportant. The observed P-Value of the data set is 0.71. Given the fact 
that the P Value is greater than 0.05, it fails to provide sufficient evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis.  
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B. INTEREST IN SECESSION AND ANNUAL INCOME  
 The correlation between interest in secession and annual income is vir-
tually non-existent (0.02). The P value is 0.58 and thus is insufficient to re-
ject the null hypothesis.  
C. SERIOUSNESS OF CLAIM AND ANNUAL INCOME  
 The correlation between interest in secession and seriousness of claim 
is virtually non-existent (-0.01). The P Value is 0.60 and thus is insufficient 
to reject the null hypothesis.  
D. ANNUAL INCOME ANALYSIS  
 Ultimately, there appears to be a weak and statistically insignificant re-
lationship between a person’s average annual income and their support for 
and interest in the ‘Yes California’ movement and its contemporaries. While 
the correlation coefficient on its own is certainly not strong enough to indi-
cate that it is the sole and unequivocally most important predictor in a per-
son’s support for the movement, its value is low enough to provide an indi-
cation that income is not a sufficient indicator of whether or not a person 
supports secession.  
E. INDEX 
 For an additional piece of analysis, I created an index of ‘Support for 
Secession’, ‘Interest in Secession’ and ‘Seriousness of Claim’ and measured 
the correlation between the index and income and the index and ideology. 
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Compared to the individual values, the results were much more striking.  
A Pearson correlation test yielded a 0.6, indicating that there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between the index and the relative level of 
conservatism of the participant.  
 The correlation between the index and income, however, was -0.01, 
which is statistically insignificant.  
F. INDEX REGRESSION 
 Utilizing the index as the dependent variable and income ideology, 
gender, race and political activity as the independent variables, I performed 
a multi-variate linear regression. The P values for race (0.38) and income (0. 
69) are sufficiently high to accept the null hypothesis. However, the P values 
for gender (0.0001), race (0.00120) and political activity (0.0002) are below 
the 0.05 mark, and thus, are sufficient to reject the null hypothesis.  
 The rejection of the null hypothesis for gender indicates that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between gender and the index. The data 
indicates that for every singular unit of movement in the gender measure, 
the index increases 1.32 units, pointing to a statistically significant positive 
relationship.  
 The rejection of the null hypothesis for race indicates that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between race and the index. The data in-
dicates that for every singular unit of movement in the race measure, the 
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index increases 1.16 units, pointing to a statistically significant positive rela-
tionship.  
 The rejection of the null hypothesis for the political activity measure 
indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between political 
activity and the index. The data indicates that for every singular unit of 
movement in the political activity measure, the index increases 1.7 units, 
pointing to a statistically significant positive relationship.   
G. TRUNCATION OF NUMBERS  
 A key problem with the 
data collected was that there 
was a heavy skew towards 
results from lower income 
brackets and a noted lack of 
responses in the inverse. 
This is likely because those 
that utilize the MTurk service 
skew heavily towards lower income brackets. Therefore, the long left leaning 
tails of the data served to reduce potential correlation. The extremities at 
the upper end that did manifest themselves upset the Pearson correlation 
formula. In order to determine if there was potentially a stronger relation-
ship in lower incomes levels, I chose to truncate the numbers as a secondary 
form of data analysis to check for additional correlation.  
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 Generally speaking, the results indicated only a marginally stronger 
correlation in the data than when the higher socioeconomic values were in-
cluded in the analysis. For the purposes of the truncation, all subjects re-
porting an income of over one hundred thousand dollars a year were omit-
ted. However, this change did not yield a strong enough additional insight to 
merit an addition to this paper. In essence, the addition of this step only 
served to further emphasize the findings of the earlier research.  
X. Potential Problems  
 There are several potential problems with the survey population that 
must be addressed before my results can be considered valid. Primarily, it is 
highly unlikely that the slice of population that utilizes the Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk (MTurk) software is representative of the American population at 
large. The demographic that utilizes MTurk tends to be overwhelmingly male 
and overwhelmingly white or Asian. There is little African American or His-
panic representation on the platform, an issue that is particularly potent 
when considering the demographics of the part of the country this survey 
and this thesis targeted. Another potential problem is that, given the fact 
that this a survey, all the answers were self-reported. Beyond the problems 
inherent in self-selection are the issues that come with the fact that I, as it 
stands, have no way to verify this information. As the researcher, it must be 
noted that there is no mechanism inherent in collection of my survey data 
that allows me to test for individual accuracy of the results in relation to the 
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participant. Therefore, trusting my findings also involves trusting the partici-
pants.  
Another potential issue comes from the fact that this survey was con-
ducted during a period of time in which the atmosphere of the country is 
particularly politically charged. While there is no clear metric to indicate this 
fact, it is common knowledge that the intensity of political discourse is at an 
all-time high. Therefore, it is entirely possible that support for the movement 
among those polled was represented as higher than it ultimately is. It is per-
fectly possible that the level of general discontent in the country right now 
has artificially inflated the support for secession and left us with a set of re-
sults that will be less accurate in six months’ time when tensions, one way or 
another, have been ameliorated.  
 However, while there are, as with any research project, potential prob-
lems with the data set, they are not sufficiently more severe than those 
faced by other academic outings to merit the complete and total discounting 
of this paper’s findings. MTurk is an industry standard and is used by acade-
mics on a regular basis. Therefore, while it may not be entirely representa-
tive of the population, it is certainly representative enough to pass the base 
threshold for academic acceptability. The self-reporting problem mentioned 
above, too, can be disregarded because it is a problem indicative of all sur-
veys and the massive sample size should, theoretically, off set misreporting. 
Finally, the issue of the political climate is only terribly consequential if this 
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situation is not the new normal. Given the fact that there is no clear indica-
tion that there will be a return to that aforementioned normalcy anytime in 
the near future, this survey’s results are still worth interpreting and, there-
fore, can ultimately still be considered valid.  
XI. Results 
 Ultimately, this survey proves that, among Americans, there is little to 
no relationship between one’s annual income and one’s support for the Cali-
fornian secessionist movement. It is possible to extrapolate further, based on 
the framing of the survey, that this feeling is not entirely solely related to 
that of this particular case. It is highly unlikely that this reality is limited to 
this instance and that money is no longer a primary indicator of secessionist 
support, but this would require additional research. Based on the unimpor-
tance of both ideology and annual income, this survey does suggest the ex-
istence of another variable that operates as the primary indicator for 
whether or not a person chooses to support such movements, but it does 
not guarantee it. It is unlikely that there is an incredible degree of random-
ness to the composition of these types of supporters. The research does in-
dicate a statistically significant relationship between the political ideology of 
the participant and their support for Californian secession. The research also 
indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between the race 
of the participant, as well as the gender and degree of political activity and 
the index. It does appear to indicate that an index of the aforementioned 
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values in the data section does positively correlate weakly with the income 
of the participant.  
XII. Further Research 
 While it is my belief that the results of this survey are relevant to the 
discussion at hand, further research should attempt to increase the sample 
size of those surveyed, as well as take measures to increase validity by in-
suring that those participating within the questionnaire are accurately self-
reporting. Future researchers should also work to determine what exactly 
the determining variable (or variables) is, as this particular body of work 
only served to eliminate two key suspects and suggest race and gender as 
weak corollaries. Future research should also attempt to isolate Californians 
out from the dataset and analyze them individually. As the current scholarly 
research on this topic is relatively thin, any research in any direction would 
be valuable towards increasing the academic acumen of the topic at hand.  
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